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Abstract: The monetary policy mechanism by which monetary policy was transmitted to the
real economy had emerged as the pivotal discussion topic recently. This paper tried to discuss
the impact of Bank Indonesia’s monetary policy on loan bank. By using simple loan bank
framework we concluded that monetary policies were able to influence loan bank.  The
monetary variables such as discount rate policy, base money and exchange rate  policy were
very important in determining the banking credit. As the credit was very important to influences
the economic activitiy, the result provided evidence that monetary policy was important as a
tool to control economic activity via credit channel. The validity of this study challenged the
hypotheses that monetary policy was death. However, monetary policy maker should carefully
consider the soundness of the banking industry because it was a strategic partner for monetary
authority to control the economic activities.
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The monetary policy mechanism by which monetary
policy is transmitted to the real economy has
emerged as the pivotal discussion topic recently
because the reality that monetary policy has become
the only game can be played by the central bank.
Many economists, even, believe that monetary
policy is not important anymore. However, as the
economic situation among countries are dispersed,
the empirical investigation resulted from various
studies are also, in some cases, contradictionary and
confusing. That is why it is a debatable topic in
macroeconomics in general and monetary study
especially.
For Indonesia, the understanding and ability
of Indonesia Monetary Authority how monetary
policy works is necessary mandate of the new
Central Bank Act of 1999 especially to help the
economic recovery. The understanding how
monetary policy works requires enhancements both
the capacity and institutional buildings for better
monetary policy making process and implemen-
tation.  As enacted in 1999, the new Central Bank
Act provides a clear mandate for Bank Indonesia in
conducting its monetary policy to maintain the
value of Rupiah both in domestic and international
term.
The Act No. 23 of 1999 on Bank Indonesia
that amend the previous Act No.13 of 1968 states
that the single objective of Bank Indonesia (BI) as a
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central bank is to achieve and to maintain the
stability of the value of Rupiah. To achieve this
objective, BI has a role in formulating and
implementing the monetary policy, regulating and
safeguarding the smoothness of the payment
system, and also regulating and supervising banks
before the new authority established.. Refer to the
Act, BI gets its independency. It means other party
shall not intervene BI in performing its tasks. The
act also bring substantial change because the role
of BI as an agent of development is deleted. The
direct operation in the credit market is not possible
then.
Unfortunately, the loss of public confidence
in effectiveness monetary policy that target price
stability or the exchange rate has forced central
banks to look for a more credible nominal anchor.
Indonesia recently adopted explicit inflation
targeting as their monetary policy regime although
the base money is still the main target.
Broadly speaking, price stability defined as the
price level remains constant, that is, that the
inflation rate is zero. But this is not what economists
and central bankers usually mean but mostly follow
Fischer (1996) that argues the government should
pursue an average rate of annual inflation centered
at 2 percent, with a tolerance interval of plus or
minus 1 percent.
Currently, the main investigation efforts are
directed to study on the role played by banking
industry in the transmission of monetary policy. The
aim is to uncover a credit channel of monetary
policy. As the credit channel operates through shifts
in loan-supply schedules, uncovering the credit
channel in monetary policy means nothing but to
looking on the impact of monetary policy
instrument to banking industry.
Warjio and Agung (2002) mentioned the
reasons why Indonesian monetary authority is eager
to study monetary policy channel because the
understanding the movements of financial and
economic aggregates as result of monetary policy
would improve the understanding the link between
the financial and the real sectors of the economy.
Second, a better understanding of the transmission
mechanism would help monetary authorities and
analysts to interpret movements in financial
aggregates. Finally, more information about the
transmission mechanism might lead to a better
choice of intermediate monetary targets. As
concluded by Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjetta
(2000) the interest rate shock may be necessary to
prevent crisis economy from further recession when
the responses of such policy by credit supply not so
strongly.
Figure 1
Framework of Monetary Policy In Indonesia
Bassically, the framework of monetary policy
in Indonesia can be explained here. Open market
operation (OMO), Reserve requirement, dicount
rate and moral suasion are still the main policies.
These policie are aimed to influence monetary
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aggregate such as base money, lending capacity of
banking system and off course, interest rate.
However, the ultimate target of monetary policy is
to achive stabil economic growth, price stability,
emplayoment and external balance. In Indonesia,
monetary policy in term of interest rate policy is
also aimed to reduce budget deficit due to most of
governement bonds are price using central bank
discount rate as anchor rate.
 In the country experiencing multi crisis,
banking, exchange rate and political crises,
Indonesian monetary authority worked hard to make
the credit channel work. The monetary policy
currently is in questionable stage as Indonesia curretly
lack of supported institution and condition for
succesful monetary policy, such bank capital
constraint (CAR), exchange rate instability and firm
restructuring process. All these lessen the
effectiveness of monetary policy. Under dis-
intermediation in the banking industry, indicated by
Loan to deposit ratio (LDR) currently at only 34%,
the validity of the monetary policy is on attack. The
attacks based on the assumption that the work of
credit channel depends on the extent to which banks
rely on deposit financing and adjust their loan supply
schedules following changes in bank reserves as
responses to monetary policy action.
The economic crisis that began in the mid-
1997 completely changed monetary and banking
landscape in Indonesia. After nearly ten years of
rapid expansion, Indonesia’s banking system is
crippled, with the vast majority of dominant local
banks now technically bankrupt without
government supports. It then means that when
banks strive to survive, no actions will be done to
responses the monetary policy action but only
responding to prevent from the death. However,
the study is not based on that presumption. We still
believe that the roles of monetary variables are still
important to influences the bank managers to
change their loan or balance sheet position.
THEORITICAL BACKGROUND
The debate on the monetarty policy via bank
lending channel and balance sheet chanel emerged
from the existence of assymentric information
problem between lender and borrowers. Bank
lending channel focuses on the assumption that
bank loan is very important for successful monetary
policy.  In the monetary policy channel via the “bank
lending “(Bernanke and Blinder,1988),  monetary
transmission mechanism was delivered by banks
upon changing their assets as well as their liabilities.
Arestis and Sawyer (2002) identify six possible
channels of monetary policy can be. There are to
begin with, the channels traditionally identified in
the literature: the interest rate channel; the wealth
effect channel; the exchange rate channel. These
are what has been termed the monetarist channel.
Two further channels have been identified more
recently: these two are essentially a credit channel
normally discussed as comprising two channels: the
narrow credit channel (sometimes referred to as the
balance sheet channel), and the broad credit
channel.
Banking industry has special role. Himmelberg
and Morgan (1995) suggest that lenders attempt
to control agency problems by imposing restrictive
covenants in lending contracts. These covenants
require firms to maintain minimum levels of net
worth and working capital to prevent become the
“zombie company”. That is the reason of
monitoring. Diamond (1984) suggests that the bank
as the delegated monitor of depositors. Himmelberg
and Morgan (1995) argue that intermediaries are
more efficient at monitoring financial contracts
because reusability of information dan ability to
force debtors more efficient.
During a monetary contraction situation,
banks will decrease their reserves and reduce their
deposits and the the loan. In a monetary expansion,
banks increase the loan. If the decrease in deposits
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is not offset by other funds which are not subject
to reserve requirements,or by a decrease in
securities,this will result in a decrease in bank loans.If
bank loans fall and bank dependent borrowers are
dominant in the economy,real investment
expenditure will fall. Since bank loans in Indonesia
remain the main source of external finance for
business enterprises,a disrupting of bank loan supply
can reduce the economic activity.
Kim (1999), using Korean cases, found that
bank credit channel is significant after the crisis. The
sharp drops in credit supply in line to the eastern
asia crisis reduced credit supply provided evidence
that constractive monetary policy  was responded.
There is strong evidence that a substantial excess
demand for bank loans becuause of a dramatic
decrease in loan supply as impact of banking crisis.
Previously, Kasyap and Stein (1997) found
supportive evidences that credit channel is as
monetary policy channel. The study was using USA
bank panel data  during 1976-1993. The study found
evidences the impact of monetary policy that
affected bank’s propensity to lend, especially among
illiquid banks.,For Indonesian cases, Agung (1998),
using sample data from 1985-1995, proved that a
monetary policy was able to influence the bank
supply of credit, in particular small banks, not large
banks which were able to shield their bank loan
supply by finding the cheaper source of funds from
overseas. Further investigation using aggregate
data during episode of crisis, Warjio and Agung
(2002) conclude that monetary policy is still effective
to affect bank lending. However different type of
bank has different elasticity.
DeBondt (2000) finds evidence for the
reaction of bank lending to monetary policy mainly
depends on bank size. On the other hand, Favero
et al. (1999) do not find such evidence using the
same database in a cross-sectional analysis. Worms
(2001), Quoted from Kakes and Strum, (2002) – study
using the Bundesbank´s bank balance sheet statistics
covering all German banks– conclude that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the reaction of a
bank´s lending to monetary policy depends on its
size, although this effect does not seem to be of
macroeconomic importance.
The finding support Kashyap and Stein (1995)
that as long as the banks do not face a perfectly
elastic demand for their managed liabilities, a bank
lending channel will operate. However, some argue
that the regulatory action of central banks can also
significantly influence bank loan supply. For
example, the regulation on loan classification and
capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Interested paper on
this issue is the work of Peek and Rosengren (1995),
The capital Crunch : Neither a borrower nor lender
be, Journal of Credit Money and Banking,  27, p
149-213
Altunbas, Fazylop and Molyneux (2002) add
more confusions on the role of bank channel in the
monetary policy. By using bank specific data for
European case, they  found that smaller and
undercapitalized banks were more responsive to
monetary policy. Small banks which have relatively
limited access to non-deposit funds such as securities
issues or foreign borrowings are expected to be more
affected by the monetary shock and to tend to cut
their loan supplies immediately following the shock.
However, across European countries resulted in
inconsistent results and suggest further verification
and examinations. Their findings are in line to
Ehrmann et al. (2001) that testing for a differential
reaction of bank loans to monetary policy across
banks for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the euro-
area as a whole and conclude no evidence for a bank
lending channel using bank size as the discriminating
variable. They also show that the data summarized
by BankScope is not necessarily a useful database
for exercises of this kind.
These inconsistent results may arise as the
impact of the banking industrial strucutre of Europe
as mentioned by Lensink and Sterken (2002). Both
suggest to view credit market within industrial
organisation of banking sector, considering
structural factor in the economy, business cycle and
institutional factors among nations. However, using
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individual firm data, Nilsen (1999) concludes  the
bank lending channel become less important to
transfer the effect of monetary policy because small
firms still can  increase their demand on loan by
shifting from investment loan to trade credit.
The importance of banking in the economy
especially to the behavior of output that driven by
aggregate bank credit will be necessary condition
for prompt economic recovery. During the crisis,
banks were forced to cut lending, and this resulting
“credit crunch” . This is, then believed as the
propagation and deepening the crisis. So then
restoring the flow of credit should be a priority for
policy-makers in the immediate aftermath of
banking crises. Bernanke (1983) argued that the
contraction in credit inhibited by the banking crisis
was instrumental in the propagation of the Great
Depression in the U.S. Recent attempt to test for a
credit crunch effect in Indonesia was done by Hariadi
(2002) and found the evidences of credit crunch
during the crisis.
The study on the monetary policy strategy in
Indonesia during the banking crisis has been
investigated extensively especially by Fane (2000). The
strategy was mainly controlling the growth of M0. In
sum, achieving a modest target for domestic inflation
would not have been very different in practice from
setting tight limits on the growth of M0.
METHODOLOGY
The Framework of The Study.
The point of departure of the study is based
on assumptiona adopted from Luísa Farinha and
Carlos Robalo Marques , The Bank Lending Channel
Of Monetary Policy: Identification And Estimation
Using Portuguese Micro Bank Data,  ECB Working
Paper 102, December 2001 which states that the
monetary policy works by affecting bank assets
(loans) and banks’ liabilities (deposits). The key point
is that monetary policy besides shifting the supply
of deposits also shifting the supply of bank loans.
In this context, the crucial response of banks to
monetary policy is their lending response and not
their role as deposit creators. The two key necessary
conditions that must be satisfied for a lending
channel to operate are: (a) banks cannot shield their
loan portfolios from changes in monetary policy;
and (b) borrowers cannot fully insulate their real
spending from changes in the availability of bank
credit.
The first condition assumes that banks are not
able to completely offset the decrease in deposits
brought about by monetary policy shocks, by
resorting to alternative sources of funds (at least
not without incurring in increasing costs). Because
of the extra premium that banks have to pay to
bring in alternative external funds, banks will make
fewer loans after the fall in reserves brought about
by monetary policy. Of course, it is expected that
banks hedge against changes in monetary policy,
by holding securities as a buffer against a reserve
outflow. But such buffer is not expected to fully
offset the effects of a monetary policy contraction,
as buffer stocks are costly for banks (in terms of
interest foregone).
The second condition assumes that some
spending, which is financed with bank loans, will
not occur if banks cut the loans, else the real
consequences of the credit channel will be null. In
summary, while the traditional theory emphasizes
the households’ preferences between money and
other liquid assets (bonds) the credit view argues
that the banking behavior is also very important to
the transmission of monetary policy .
According to Warjio and Agung (2002) there
are two necessary conditions for the validity of the
bank lending channel; bank loans and securities must
be imperfect substitutes for some borrowers, or some
borrowers are bank dependent, second the central
bank must be able to constrain the supply of bank
loans using all available instruments. It seems these
conditions are valid in Indonesia Case especially if
we refer to Agung (1998).
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Data
The data used in this study are aggregate data
and collected mainly from  Asia Recovery Information
Center (ARIC) database, Asia Development Bank. The
data is monthly and totally we got 131 observation
from Januari 1991 to June 2002. We treated all data
to fullfil stationarity using Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test. When the data is stasionair at the level, no
further treatments were conducted. If not the data
is then differentiated.  We assume the period of the
banking and exchange rate crisis are started in July
1997.
Variables
Variables employed in this study are discount
rate (SBI), Index of banking sector deposits
(INADEPIDX) , the growth of base money (INAGM0),
the exchange rate movement index (DINAKURS)
(July 1997 as 100), dummy variable for crisis (CRISIS)
and for dependent variables the change in bank
credit growth (INARBC).
Model of Analysis
To estimate the impact of monetary policy
variables to the bank lending, the model of analysis
used in this study is linear regression using the
change in total banking system credit as dependent
variable.  The model is formulated below:
DINARBC = α1 SBI + α2 INADEPIDX + α3 INAGMO +
α4 DINAKURS + α5 CRISIS + å
Definition:
DINARBC = The Changes in Total Banking
System Credit
SBI = Discount Rate of Central Bank
INADEPIDX = Index of Deposits Change
INAGMO = Growth of Base Money (M0)
DINAKURS = Change in Exchange Rate Index (July
1997 as    Baseline)
CRISIS = Dummy for Crisis ( July 1997 and
Aftermath as    1, previous is 0)
Estimation is carried out using Eview
Statistical Packard Programme using  ARCH model,
order 1 both for ARCH and GARCH and no error
term is selected.
The hipotheses we are to tested is on the work
of monetary aggregate such as discount rate, base
money and exchange rate, as monetary policy
variable to influence bank lending. In the light of
economic crisis, we also test the impact of this
situation on the bank lending channel of monetary
policy. We expect that the economic crisis lower the
ability of monetary policy to influence the bank
lending. As the crisis created volatility on all
aggregates data, we expect that volatility will
increase compared to the previous period. We
modelled the news about volatility using the lag of
the squared residual from the mean equation (the
ARCH term). Consequence of such a condition is  the
last period’s forecast variance (the GARCH term)
which  will increase and be significant.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptives statistic of
the data used in the study. Two variables, DINARBC
and DINAKURS, own negative mean.  The coefficient
of variation, measure by dividing standard deviation
with its mean value, shows very interesting results.
For the DINARBC, the coeficient variation  is more
than 45 so the variation is high or more than 45
time of its mean. The coefficient variation for
DINAKURS is 4.6 meaning the variation is 4.6 time
of its mean. For the SBI, INADEPIDX, and INAGMO
the coefficient are less than one. It means the
variations are quite low. However, similar to time
series data, all variables are are not normally
distributed.
PERBANKAN
106 JURNAL KEUANGAN DAN PERBANKAN
Vol. 12, No. 1, Januari 2008: 100 – 110
Table 1. Descriptive Statisitics of The Data Used.
DINARBC SBI INADEPIDX INAGMO DINAKURS CRISIS
 Mean -252.8767  18.12609  112.1156  19.91170 -0.729071  0.434783
 Median  1235.065  14.14000  81.21174  18.76434 -0.367495  0.000000
 Maximum  92401.36  70.81000  244.7974  60.31731  6.260430  1.000000
 Minimum -74961.37  7.450000  26.74673 -3.211550 -24.86328  0.000000
 Std. Dev.  15318.06  12.07641  73.24712  11.74330  3.398923  0.497534
 Skewness -0.164680  2.894416  0.479992  1.398442 -4.398113  0.263117
 Kurtosis  19.59510  11.29209  1.630116  5.614703  28.88497  1.069231
 Jarque-Bera  1584.158  588.0491  16.08937  84.29056  4297.580  23.02756
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000321  0.000000  0.000000  0.000010
 Observations 140 140 140 140 140 140
Table 2. The Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the estimation result of the
role of banking credit as monetary policy
transmitter. The R-squared is 40% and the adjusted
R-Squared  is only 37%. The null hypothesis stating
the model can not be used as a tool to analyse the
impact of monetary policy is rejected. The F statisitic
is 11.17. If we look at the table, we will see the F-
table is 3,12. Further more, if we look at Probabaility
of F-statisitics, it is significiant at 1%. It means the
model is plausible to be used as tool of analysis.
Dependent Variable: DINARBC
Method: ML – ARCH
Date: 07/07/04   Time: 13:06
Sample (adjusted): 1991:01 2002:09
Included observations: 140 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 45 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
SBI
INADEPIDX
INAGMO
DINAKURS
CRISIS
C
-406.7667
104.5336
183.3257
-2132.700
-18213.36
-2147.124
83.45679
32.17334
82.50008
212.1771
3986.228
2743.143
-4.873980
3.249075
2.222128
-10.05151
-4.569070
-0.782724
0.0000
0.0012
0.0263
0.0000
0.0000
0.4338
Variance Equation
17746997
0.219076
0.045630
4.946096
2.589716
-2.249936
C
ARCH(1)
GARCH(1)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat
87778343
0.567345
-0.102664
0.409264
0.372629
12132.93
1.90E+10
-1443.330
2.290139
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)
0.0000
0.0096
0.0245
-252.8767
15318.06
21.04826
21.23916
11.17146
0.000000
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However, the ARCH and GARCH effect existed
in capturing time varying condition. That is why we
use ARCH (1)  and GARCH (1) method for estimation
process and found both ARCH and GARCH are
significant. Off course, this estimation’s method
made the serial correlation disapeared from the
model. Fortunately, the coefficient of the ARCH (1)
term is less than one meaning that the bank lending
channel directs to stable condition. In term of
GARCH (1) term the estimation found that it is
negative and very low. Adding ARCH (1) coefficient
, 0.567 and GARCH (1), - 0.1, we get 0,467 or less
than 0,5. It means the volatility is decreasing.  Both
results confirmed us that monetary policy via bank
lending are getting better and may indicating the
crisis is closing to end. Monetary authority must use
this evidence as information that the convergence
to stability must be maintained and policy must
carefully be formulated
The expected result for SBI is negative to
indicate the existance of competing return between
investing fund in central bank instrument than in
the lending. The coefficient of Variable SBI is –406.77
. The z-statitics is -4.87 and significant at 1%. It
means when other thing is assumed unchanged, an
increase by 1% in discount rate will reduce the credit
disbursement by 400 billion rupiah. The high
coefficient of SBI provide evidence the role of
discount rate policy as monetary policy variable. This
information  is very usefull and it can be used by
central bank to manage credit market and thus real
sector as well. As the direction  of Indonesian
monetary policy can be investigated through the
central bank discount rate policy, the evidence
provides supports to continue the use this policy
variable carefully. Indonesian central bank mainly
uses the discount rate policy as a mean of reducing
inflation . However this evidence strongly advises
that it may endanger the credit market hence the
real sector.
The expected result for depsosit is positive
because the deposits is supply of funds for loan
making. The variable INADEPIDX is to measure the
movement of banking system deposits. The
coefficient is 104.53 and the z-statitistics is significant
at 1%. This variable is control variable and should
have positive value because any increase in deposits
should be followed by making more loan. However,
in line to the crisis, it seems the central bank will be
more dificult to force bank that is preferer not
producing loan but using the funds  to buy central
bank securities ( Bank Indonesia Certificate). At this
time almost 20% of bank productive asset is on Bank
Indonesia Certificate. However, evidence that the
amount of loans channeled is determined by total
deposits collected is unchallenged.
The base money is expectd to give positive
sign.  Variable INAGMO is used to measured the
change in base money circulated (M0). The
coefficient is 183  and the z-statisitics is 2.22 so it is
significant at 3%. The ceofficient is positive so it
provide the information content that central bank
effort to increase the M0 will increase loan disbursed
by the banks.
Exchange rate is expected to give negative sign
as the depreciation of IDR (RP) will send negative
sign to lenders as well as borrower that the prosepect
of econmy is downward. Variable DINAKURS is used
to investigate the impact of exchange rate policy to
the banking credit. The coefficient is negative so any
depreciation in rupiah will hurt the effort to increase
the credit. The coefficient is –2132 meaning this
variable  is a very shocking variable because every
one poin index increase in the exchange rate index
will reduce  2.13 billions rupiah credit.   That is why
the effort by central bank to retain and make Rupiah
stronger should be supported. International
cooperation among Asian countrie to set up the
Asian Currency Swap Arrangement is necessary to
prevent rupiah from speculative attacks. However,
as the total external debt of Indonesia currently
reaching  USD 150 billions or almost 172% of GDP, it
makes impossible for the central bank to manage
the exchange rate problem freely. Current total
foreign exchange reserved held by the central bank
is only USD 29 Billions.
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Indonesia has experienced economic crisis since
the mid of 1997. This crisis brought a substantial
impact to the whole economy. The variable CRISIS is
dummy variable to cope with this crisis. The
coefficient is – 18213 and the z-statisitics is -4.57 so it
is significant at 1%. The result provides evidence that
the banking industry faces very difficult time during
the crisis. Due to their huge foreign exchange open
posisition as result big borrowing in  USD, most of
big banks economically bankrupt because they lent
it in Rupiah denominated loans. The crisis also
increase NPL reaching 70%. In general,  the crisis has
negative impact to the banking industry and reduce
the capacity of credit demand. This finding support
Hariadi (2002).
The actual, and fitted figure are very closed
before the year 1998. It provides information how
this model can capture the impact of the crisis. After
the year 2000, the  actual and fitted value were very
closed almost reaching the situation before the crisis
again. However when we looked at figure 3, we see
how the residual of this model behaved, it can be
easily identified that the residual is not normaly
distributed because the Jarque-Bera staitisics is 385.
CONCLUSION
From the discusion above we could conclude
that the role of the bank credit as monetary policy
channel in Indonesia is unchallenged.  The monetary
variables such as discount rate policy, base money
and exchange rate  policy are very important in
determining the banking credit. As the credit is very
important to influences the economic activitiy, the
result provide firmed evidence that monetary policy
is important as a tool to control economic activity
via credit channel. The ability of credit channel as
monetary policy channel place the banking industry
as a strategic partner for monetary authority to
control the economic activities. It also provided
support that monetary authority action increased
discount rate until 70% during the crisis was
necessary although it was not sufficient.
During the time of crisis, monetary policy via
bank credit  is less effective. Very high coefficient of
crisis dummy variables indicated that during that
periode any action to control  credit by increasing
the discount rate produced contraproductive result.
Other measure such as moral suation and temporary
credit control can be supplemented policies.
As financial institutions play a crucial role in
channeling funds from those who save to those who
invest. Academic research has therefore given much
attention to studying the terms under which such
institutions both borrow and lend to fulfill this role
as intermediary. However, for micro analysis, the
difficulty in studying banks’ lending come from the
complicated nature of financial contracts such as
collateral requirements, flexible payment schedules,
commitments, and other non-price terms. Even
monetary stability is not enough. This study is very
broad so can not provide explanation why the
lending getting decrease while the situation is more
favorable. However this study provide strong
evidences that monetary is still useful and necessary
as a tool to influence bank lending.
The result from ARCH and GARCH model
found that the volatility are decreasing and nearly
toward stable situation. However, as this study
contain some limitation especially on the level of
data used. Future study to investigate how credit
market working by using monthly bank level data
during the crisis time. Therefore, it can provide basis
for correct policy action in the future.
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